



COSTLY CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL IMPACT OF CONGRESS' ELIMINATION OF THE TANF SUPPLEMENTAL GRANTS

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FIRST FOCUS

MAKING CHILDREN & FAMILIES THE PRIORITY



In June 2011, Congress eliminated the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Supplemental Grants to 17 states. This report describes what the loss of this \$319 million in federal assistance has meant for states that already had very little to spend on some of the poorest children in the nation, and how Congress can act to restore this essential support.

This report updates an earlier First Focus publication, *TANF Supplemental Grants: Reforming and Restoring Support for Children Who Need it Most*, with TANF administrator interviews from the affected states.¹ These interviews detail what the loss of the Supplemental Grants has meant in practice one year after their elimination.

HOW WE GOT HERE

From 1935 until “welfare reform” in 1996, the federal government reimbursed states to provide cash assistance of last resort to poor children and their parents. The program, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children* (AFDC), a legacy of the New Deal, was an entitlement. States set income eligibility and benefit amounts, and the federal government reimbursed them based on matching rates inversely proportional to state income. Families that met the state’s eligibility rules were entitled to the monthly benefits determined by the state, and the AFDC budgets took cyclical fluctuations in caseloads into account. Since the federal government reimbursed states for most of the costs, AFDC payments worked as automatic fiscal stabilizers, with higher expenditures during periods of recession and lower expenditures during periods of growth.

With the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, the federal government replaced AFDC with TANF. Unlike an entitlement, the annual amount of the base TANF grant is fixed, regardless of the caseload fluctuations associated with periods of growth and recession. The TANF block grant is also fixed as a nominal amount, which means that the real purchasing power of total TANF funding received by states, as well as the monthly cash assistance grants the states pass on to families, has eroded by nearly a third with inflation.

As lawmakers created TANF, they debated how to prevent states from cutting their expenditures to the lowest common denominator. The new law “locked-in” the core annual federal grant and state maintenance of effort requirements based on existing federal-state AFDC expenditures. States that spent more on low-income children in the mid-1990s receive higher annual federal TANF grants, but they are also required to maintain relatively high state “maintenance of effort” expenditures.

While this solution might have prevented states from cutting expenditures back to the lowest common denominator, it resulted in wide disparities of federal and state TANF spending per low-income child. As a result, some states, like Arkansas, have TANF funding equal to only \$500 per poor child per year, and others, like the District of Columbia, have TANF funds of more than \$5,000 per poor child per year (see [Figure 1](#)).


Lawmakers also debated how to ensure that the annual TANF grants were adequate to states with the greatest or fastest-growing needs. Ultimately, they created Supplemental Grants to progressively bring expenditures in the poorest states closer to the cross-state average, and a Contingency Fund to provide additional emergency funds to states with sharp increases in unemployment.

“Due to our population growth, our caseload goes up even when the economy is growing. During welfare reform there was a lot of discussion about whether there should be a population modifier in the basic TANF allocation. Ultimately, there was not, but the TANF SGs were intended to help states with population growth.”

– Nevada TANF Administrator



Figure 1: Annual Federal TANF Block Grant and State TANF Maintenance of Effort Requirement per Poor Child, Federal Fiscal Year 2010



Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways & Means, 2008; U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS) 2010.

The TANF Supplemental Grants were provided to 17 states with low spending per poor resident or high population growth, as listed in **Table 1**. On average, the Supplemental Grants increased the total federal grant per low-income child by approximately 10 percent in receiving states. Although significant disparities remain, the TANF Supplemental Grants brought TANF spending in the 17 receiving states to approximately just less than half of the amount spent in the other states, as shown in **Figure 2**.

In the first few years of TANF, the 17 states received 2.5 percent increases annually through the Supplemental Grants to bring spending incrementally closer to the cross-state average. But before long, the funding became victim to its name (for more information, see the December 2011 First Focus publication, *TANF Supplemental Grants: Reforming and Restoring Support for Children Who Need it Most*). Although the grants were an integral component of TANF funding for the qualifying states, the “supplemental” designation rendered them vulnerable to subsequent budget cuts. After 2001, Congress eliminated the annual increases, essentially flat funding the Supplemental Grants, and in June of 2011, Congress allowed the Supplemental Grants to expire. This ends \$319 million in annual federal TANF funding to 17 states. **Figure 3** shows the total annual allocations for the TANF Supplemental Grants for 1998-2011.



Table 1: States Receiving TANF Supplemental Grants

	Qualifying Criteria		
	Low Spending, Pre-TANF	High Pop. Growth, Pre-TANF	Low Spending & High Pop. Growth Post-TANF
Alabama	✓		
Alaska		✓	
Arizona		✓	
Arkansas	✓		
Colorado		✓	
Florida			✓
Georgia			✓
Idaho		✓	
Louisiana	✓		
Mississippi	✓		
Montana			✓
Nevada		✓	
New Mexico			✓
North Carolina			✓
Tennessee			✓
Texas	✓		
Utah		✓	
Total	5	6	6

Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book 2004.

Figure 2: Annual Federal TANF Block Grant, State TANF Maintenance of Effort Requirement, and Supplemental Grant, Per Poor Child, Federal Fiscal Year 2010







Figure 3: Total Annual Allocation (Millions) for TANF Supplemental Grants, 1998-2011



Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book (2000, 2004, 2008); Falk, G. 2011, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant: a Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements".

IMPACTS OF THE CUTS ON VULNERABLE CHILDREN IN SOME OF THE POOREST STATES

Times are very different now than when welfare reform was passed. In the late 1990s, the fixed TANF block grant and record caseload declines left many states with more resources than usual to use for direct cash assistance and employment services for TANF participants. Unprecedented economic growth provided ample jobs, and new policies like the enhanced *Earned Income Tax Credit* (EITC) and *Children's Health Insurance Program* (CHIP) made work pay better than cash assistance alone.

Recognizing that welfare reform was one of the most sweeping domestic policy changes in decades, the first few years of policy and program implementation were closely scrutinized by policymakers, administrators, advocates, journalists, and researchers. Some elements of the reforms, such as earnings supplements and employment services, followed years of careful research under state waiver programs. Other elements, like time limits, full family sanctions, and citizenship provisions were implemented as abrupt, untested, high-stakes ultimatums.

In welfare reform, Congress gave the states additional resources and unprecedented flexibility to design their own cash assistance program in return for achieving caseload reductions and higher participation in employment-related activities. The law required that federal and state maintenance of effort expenditures should be allocated only to programs and services "reasonably calculated" to serve one of the four broad goals of the TANF program: (1) to assist needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes,



(2) to end the dependence of needy parents by promoting work and marriage, (3) to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and (4) to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.

In the late 1990s, amidst unprecedented prosperity, programmatic flexibility, and close political scrutiny, many states embraced the challenge of transforming cash assistance from an income entitlement of last resort to one that offered a combination of temporary income assistance, earnings supplements, employment services, and work supports such as childcare and transportation. Cash assistance evolved from a direct income support payment system to a broad system of employment services and supports. States experimented with different types of services and accumulated annual TANF reserves. By 2000, spending on work-related activities, like short-term job search, preparation, and placement programs doubled and spending on childcare quintupled.²

In time, TANF caseloads declined sharply, and state administrators found that they could offer more to the small population of current recipients while using the extremely flexible TANF resources in ways that eased state budget pressures. As a block grant, cash assistance quickly morphed into 50 separate programs and then within each state a dozen more. As TANF experts from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities recently noted, “While many of these may be worthy expenditures, the more broadly TANF funds are spread, the fewer resources are available to provide basic assistance and to fund work services and supports that can help recipients find and maintain employment.”³ This is particularly true when inflation erodes the eligibility levels and benefit amounts of a core income assistance grant, or when so many parents leave voluntarily or through sanctions and time limits, that most of the remaining participants are children for whom the employment services are irrelevant.

Fifteen years after welfare reform and in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession— with TANF reserves spent, the stimulus funds provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) exhausted and TANF caseloads rising— states are making difficult decision about how to reclaim TANF funds for core income assistance programs and how to make every state anti-poverty expenditure count for its intended purpose and as credit toward the state “maintenance of effort requirement.” It is in this context that 17 states experienced a further loss of TANF funds upon the elimination of the Supplemental Grants.

“The loss of the \$11 million TANF Supplemental Grant was a huge hit for a low-income state, especially when you consider that these funds were lost in connection with the loss of the stimulus funds, with a 10 percent statewide pro-rated budget cut. When you put all of this together, plus running out of the small TANF surplus ‘cushion’ we accumulated over the years, we’re in a bad way.”

—Alabama TANF Administrator

A SET OF CHOICES

With the loss of the grants, the set of 17 affected states now have difficult choices to make about which services they are willing and able to fund. One set of choices affected states have made cuts TANF’s core function as an income support system of last resort. New Mexico reduced the core TANF monthly assistance grant, even lower than its inflation-eroded value. At the extreme, Alabama policymakers are seriously debating whether or not to terminate the TANF program altogether. A second set of choices cuts the job training, placement, and support services that embodied the bipartisan commitment at the heart of welfare reform, to help families to make the transition from cash assistance alone to a combination of earnings, the EITC, and work supports, such as subsidized child care. A third set of choices cuts child protective services that served the first statutory goal of TANF— “supporting needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes.” Not all states have cut TANF supports and services. Several have managed to maintain existing services and supports by strategic cuts in other areas.



Cutting TANF's core function as an income support of last resort

Unlike several income assistance programs— Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps)— TANF eligibility and benefit levels are not automatically inflation-adjusted. Annual inflation has eroded the real value of federal and state expenditures and the assistance passed on to families by more than one-quarter. In addition, six states (five of them not Supplemental Grant recipients) have reduced benefit levels in 2011.⁴ Most Supplemental Grant states did not reduce benefit levels, in part because the existing levels are already so low and eligibility so stringent, but New Mexico and Arizona were exceptions. New Mexico reduced its monthly TANF grant by 15 percent from \$447 per month for a family of three to \$380. Arizona reduced its TANF cash benefit level by 20 percent and imposed a 24-month eligibility limit for receipt of cash benefits.⁵

But the most ominous state response to the loss of the TANF Supplemental Grant has come from Alabama. Earlier this year, when the legislature asked the Commissioner of Human Resources to detail the consequences of a 25 percent pro-rata budget cut, she mentioned that the state might discontinue its TANF and Child Support services altogether.⁶ In 2011, Alabama had a child poverty rate of almost 28 percent, with one-in-ten Alabama children living in extreme poverty. When welfare reform converted TANF from an entitlement to a block grant, advocates raised concerns that the overhaul would incite a “race to the bottom,” among states. For the most part, the race to the bottom never occurred. Unprecedented economic prosperity, record caseload declines, and intense political scrutiny created a climate of experimentation and healthy competition among states. Even states that implemented restrictive time limit policies, like Florida, often coupled them with generous front-end services and supports.⁷

Alabama did not initiate a race to the bottom in the mid-1990s, but the Commissioner's comments suggest that it might nevertheless drift to the bottom in 2013. The Alabama legislature avoided the worst case scenario by imposing a pro-rated budget cut of 10 percent for state fiscal year 2012 and putting the ultimate decisions before voters in a statewide referendum. In September 2012, Alabama voters will decide whether to transfer \$437.4 million from the Alabama Trust Fund, a state savings and investment account that receives most of Alabama's royalties from offshore drilling activities, to the state's General Fund. The 2013 state fiscal year budget, which begins only 12 days after the vote, depends upon voters' approval of the one-time transfer.⁸

“Our Governor and legislature have worked very hard, on a bipartisan basis, to come up with a proposal to take to the people in September to offer them the option of using the Alabama Trust Fund to support the General Fund. We are very anxious, very hopeful about the outcome of that vote in September. Everything is on the table then.”

—Alabama TANF Administrator

Cutting job training, placement, and support services

Welfare reform challenged state agencies to engage a greater portion of TANF participants in work-related activities and services, which span the gamut from relatively low-cost, low value-added job search monitoring to intensive mental health and addiction services. Within the first few years of welfare reform, caseloads declined rapidly in response to unprecedented economic growth and policies designed to make work pay better than cash assistance alone. In turn, state agencies began to spend more on services for the participants who remained on the rolls than in direct cash assistance payments. While AFDC was primarily an income transfer program, TANF became primarily a contracting program for employment services and child care. A decade later, following the Great Recession and the worst state budget crisis in recent memory, the pendulum is swinging back. TANF caseloads are rising. State TANF surpluses, emergency contingency fund allocations, and federal stimulus funds are spent. In response, states are cutting back, and the implicit contract that states would do everything possible to assist TANF participants toward sustainable jobs before they reached the TANF time limit is broken.



"It's been sort of a perfect storm for us of a low base TANF allocation, a dwindling TANF reserve, and now the loss of the TANF Supplemental Grants. We relied heavily on the TANF reserve to support a range of creative, preventative programs. As that reserve dwindles, we have to make some hard decisions. The University of Arkansas is undertaking a third-party evaluation of all of our programs to help us and the legislature to determine which are most effective."

—Arkansas TANF Administrator

One example is Arkansas' *Work Pays* program, which received national attention as a program that embodied the shifting emphasis from income entitlements to earnings supplements.⁹ Arkansas TANF participants who leave cash assistance for work but earn so little that they still qualify for assistance are eligible for *Work Pays*, which provides up to two years of monthly cash assistance that does not count toward the lifetime time limit and periodic employment retention bonuses. Despite the program's popularity, administrators noted that *Work Pays* is one of the programs vulnerable to future cuts. Similarly, Utah cut its *Back to Work* program, which offered employers placement and retention bonuses for hiring unemployed Utahans.

Other programs slated to be cut provide child care and assistance with incidental expenses for working families. Like many states, Florida transfers 20 percent of its overall TANF allocation to its Social Services Block Grant and Child Care and Development Fund. Consequently the elimination of the TANF Supplemental Grant directly affected state child care and social service expenditures.

Mississippi, Alabama, and New Mexico each cut generous monthly transportation allowances that administrators argue are critical supports to low-wage workers in rural states who drive long distances to work. New Mexico cut reimbursements of fees and books for participants enrolled in education and job training, and a semi-annual stipend to help parents to cover the costs of children's back to school clothing.

Arkansas cut \$2 million dollars from the *Career Pathways Initiative*, a program that provides tuition, transportation, and childcare services to help parents to obtain General Education Development (GED) and career training certificates from 25 participating two-year colleges across the state. Florida cut \$60.4 million in employment services subcontracted through its local workforce boards.

A third set of programs in jeopardy are intensive services to help participants with serious employment barriers, such as substance abuse and mental illness. Georgia cut \$8.6 million in Adult Addictive Disease Services, which will significantly reduce capacity for outpatient and residential treatment facilities for mothers with substance abuse problems. Nevada cut \$700,000 in drug abuse, mental health, and domestic violence services.

Cutting the child protective and youth services that enable children to be cared for in their own homes

Given its broad purposes and flexible funding, states have used TANF funds to support child welfare and youth development services. Because TANF funds are more flexible than federal child welfare funds, they can be used to support preventive and pre-placement child welfare services under the auspices of the TANF goal of helping families to care for children in their own homes. Youth development services are often considered relevant to preventing out-of-wedlock births. Both sets of preventive services have been affected by the loss of the TANF Supplemental Grants.

Several states have reduced TANF child welfare allocations. Nevada cut \$830,000 in emergency assistance for child protective services, funds that social workers use to provide incidental assistance to families in their own homes. In addition, Nevada reduced payments to kinship care foster parents by 25 percent. Georgia cut \$8.2 million in child welfare services. Arizona spends 60 percent of its TANF funds on child welfare and the loss of the TANF Supplemental Grant funding presented a challenge for child welfare system reform in the state in March 2012.¹⁰



Arkansas cut a number of innovative preventive youth programs. *Arkansas Works*, a high school graduation program that offers students access to an online software college and career planning system faced cuts of two million. Another million was cut from the *Human Services Workers in Schools Program*, which placed workers in 27 schools to provide student and family counseling, parent training, crisis intervention, and other preventive service.¹¹ Several hundred thousand dollars were cut from the *Community Investment Initiative*, which offered community and faith-based organizations resources to provide parenting, marriage, fatherhood, and youth activities.¹²

Georgia's Department of Public Health lost \$6.3 million in funding used to support the *Adolescent and Adult Health Promotion Program*, which stationed youth development coordinators in public health districts and teen centers statewide, and the *Infant and Child Health Promotion Program*, which provided home visiting, medical screening, and referral services to at-risk children.¹³

RESTORE THE SUPPLEMENTAL GRANTS AND REFORM TANF FUNDING

Cutting essential TANF supports and services to low-income children in some of the poorest areas in the nation less than two years after one of the worst recessions in history raises serious questions about the efficacy of the TANF program in its current form. Whether Congress fully reauthorizes TANF before it expires at the end of September 2012, or includes temporary flat-funding for TANF within a larger continuing resolution, the TANF Supplemental Grants should be restored. There are straightforward approaches to accomplish this, from simply using existing funds to restore the Supplemental Grant program to reforming the core TANF block grant formula.

The simplest option would be to fund the Supplemental Grants from the existing Contingency Fund.


The funds to restore the TANF Supplemental Grants are already available in the TANF Contingency Fund. As mentioned previously, in addition to the core annual block grant and the TANF Supplemental Grants to help disadvantaged states, TANF has also been allocated a Contingency Fund to provide enhanced assistance during periods of high unemployment. In the Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Congress simply drew unobligated money from the Contingency Fund to fund the TANF Supplemental Grants through the third quarter of federal fiscal year 2011.¹⁴ The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2013 recommends that Congress reassign money from the Contingency Fund in order to permanently restore the TANF Supplemental Grants.

A more ambitious approach would restructure the core TANF block grant to respond to child poverty. The implementation experiences described in this paper suggest that state resources have proven inadequate to meet TANF's goals. Core TANF income supports have been reduced, and in Alabama they might possibly be eliminated, while funds to offer parents job training and work supports, or to offer families child protective services have disappeared. One of fundamental reasons for the inadequacy of TANF resources is that the block grant has never been indexed to account for inflation.

Brookings scholar Kent Weaver, an expert on TANF funding strategies, has argued that one way to restore Supplemental Grant funding to the poorest states while moving the entire system toward a more equitable, coherent anti-poverty policy would be to begin to phase in inflation adjustment.¹⁵ For example, in the context of TANF reauthorization, Congress could offer adjust the core TANF block grant for inflation immediately for the 17 Supplemental Grant states, and phase-in adjustments for the remaining states. **Figure 4** shows that if the core TANF block grant was inflation-adjusted to its 1996 value, TANF spending per low-income child in the 17 Supplemental Grant states would be brought to a much more adequate and equitable level. This adjustment would be costly, however, amounting to more than \$4 billion. As Weaver mentions, adjusting the federal portion of the TANF grant without a corresponding increase in the state maintenance of effort requirements for those states would likely raise accusations of unfairness by the others.



Figure 4: Annual Federal TANF Block Grant (Inflation-Adjusted for the Supplemental Grant States) and State TANF Maintenance of Effort Requirement per Poor Child, Federal Fiscal Year 2010



Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways & Means, 2008; U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS) 2010.

To be successful in the long-run, TANF needs a clearer anti-poverty purpose, more adequate and equitably distributed resources, and stricter accountability. One of the greatest ironies of the TANF program is that reducing poverty was never an explicit statutory goal. With broad explicit goals including changing national patterns of household composition and flexible accountability including programmatic credits for caseload reduction and funding credits for spending for prior purposes or by third-party service providers, fifteen years after its inception, TANF is overstretched and fragmented.

This is why the earlier First Focus publication, *TANF Supplemental Grants: Reforming and Restoring Support for Children Who Need it Most*, identifies the longer-term goal of a federal program that offers more adequate and equitable “Children’s Fair Share” grants to each state based on the number of children in poverty. If the federal government provided an equalizing Children’s Fair Share grant to bring the total federal TANF allocation in each state up to the cross-state average of \$1,120, the distribution of state spending per poor child would resemble that illustrated in **Figure 5**. This adjustment would also be costly, amounting to an additional \$5 billion in annual federal spending. If the federal government insisted that these additional funds were spent on direct basic assistance to recipients, the total amount spent on direct assistance in receiving states would increase by 481 percent. This would enable states to nearly quintuple the amount of assistance provided to low-income families through strategic and locally responsive increases in eligibility and benefit amounts.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned in the previous First Focus report, the inherent weaknesses of the TANF block grant structure and the vulnerability of the Supplemental Grants were not unforeseen by attentive legislators as the bill was crafted. During one of the welfare reform debates in 1995, Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) cautioned that by



“allocating future spending on the basis of 1995 allocations, this bill fails to distribute money on any measure of need. It fails to take into account population growth or economic changes. It would permanently disadvantage states well into the future based upon choices and circumstances of 1995.”

Along with former Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR), Senator Graham proposed a “Children’s Fair Share” grant that would have equalized funding among the states over a five-year period on the basis of the proportion of children living in poverty in each state. Senator Bumpers warned that the problem with the compromise of the Supplemental Grant is it would ultimately be discontinued.

As 14 senators wrote to President George W. Bush in March 2001, “These grants are not supplemental in the sense of being add-ons; they were designed as an integral part of the TANF allocation formula and are critical to the success of our states’, and many others’, TANF programs.”

The Supplemental Grants were integral to the TANF program in the receiving states, as the senators cautioned, and their discontinuation has had real impacts on child well-being and family economic security, as this paper shows. In New Mexico the TANF benefit has been reduced by 15 percent to \$380 for a family of three. In Alabama, the entire TANF program is in jeopardy. Earnings supplement and reemployment programs that embody the spirit of TANF are at risk in Arkansas and Utah, along with supportive transportation services in rural states, and substance abuse services in Georgia and Nevada. Without flexible TANF funds, prevention and early identification of child maltreatment programs are also at risk.

Congress has a critical opportunity in the short-term to prevent further cuts by restoring the Supplemental Grants, and an important responsibility in the longer-term to reauthorize TANF in ways that clarify its purposes, equalize resources, and strengthen accountability.



NOTES

- ¹ First Focus sent short survey questionnaires to state partner organizations in Supplemental Grant states between March and April 2012. In addition, in July and August 2012, First Focus staff requested short telephone interviews with TANF administrators in the 10 low-spending Supplemental Grant states listed in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 1 (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas). Of these states, interviews were obtained for all except North Carolina. In addition, First Focus staff obtained interviews with administrators in Nevada and Utah, for a total of 12 interviews.
- ² Schott, Liz, LaDonna Pavetti, and Ife Finch, “How States Have Spent Federal And State Funds Under The Tanf Block Grant,” 2012, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
- ³ Schott, Liz, LaDonna Pavetti, and Ife Finch, 2012, p. 10.
- ⁴ Finch, Ife and Liz Schott, “TANF Benefits Fell Further in 2011 and Are Worth Much Less Than in 1996 in Most States,” November 21, 2011, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
- ⁵ Information obtained from First Focus survey questionnaire, received April 2012.
- ⁶ Sanders, Chris, “Draconian General Fund cuts OK’d by House committee,” Arise Citizens’ Policy Project, April 2012.
- ⁷ Bloom, Dan, James J. Kemple, Pamela Morris, Susan Scrivener, Nandita Verma, Richard Hendra, “The Family Transition Program: Final Report on Florida’s Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program,” 2000, MDRC.
- ⁸ Sanders, Chris, ““On the Table”: An Overview of the Sept. 18 Amendment,” Arise Citizens’ Policy Project, July 2012.
- ⁹ Farrell, Mary, Sarah Rich, Lesley Turner, David Seith, and Dan Bloom, “Welfare Time Limits An Update on State Policies, Implementation, and Effects on Families,” 2008, MDRC.
- ¹⁰ Reinhart, Mary K. March 3, 2012. The Republic/AZCentral.com. “Budget Contrasts Could Impede Arizona CPS Reform” Accessed September 4, 2012 from <http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/03/02/20120302arizona-cps-reform-budget.html>.
- ¹¹ Lyon, John. April 25, 2012. Times Record. “TANF Program Cutting Services.” Accessed July 2, 2012 from <http://swtimes.com/sections/news/state-news/arkansas-dhs-cut-funding-prevention-child-abuse.html>.
- ¹² Lyon, John. April 25, 2012. Times Record. “TANF Program Cutting Services.” Accessed July 2, 2012 from <http://swtimes.com/sections/news/state-news/arkansas-dhs-cut-funding-prevention-child-abuse.html>.
- ¹³ Richie, Clare S, “TANF Supplemental Grant,” February 2012, Georgia Budget and Policy Institute.
- ¹⁴ Lower-Basch, Elizabeth. December 9, 2010. “2011 TANF Extension.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy.
- ¹⁵ Weaver, R. Kent, “The Structure of the TANF Block Grant,” April 2002, Brookings.